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funding for university research are strategic complements as well as evidence of the ability of universities
to leverage their research infrastructure to attract research funding.
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The existence of spillovers is one of the classic arguments for government research funding
(Arrow 1962). This was clearly behind the National Science Council’s call for increased
federal funding for basic research along with increased actions by industry and the academy
to encourage greater “intellectual exchange” between industry and academic institutions
(National Science Board 2008). Unfortunately our understanding of such exchange is limited.
While we know that academic research spills over to industry, we know little about the
mechanisms involved (Jaﬀe 1989; Thursby and Thursby 2006). Much of our understanding
comes from the analysis of spillovers associated with publications or patents (Adams 1990;
Jaﬀe et al. 1993). Except for studies of licensing or start-ups from universities, there is little
modeling of the actual mechanisms behind such spillovers (Zucker et al. 1998; Thursby and
Thursby 2008).
In this paper, we examine industrial consulting by university faculty as a mechanism for
spillovers in a context that allows us to link them to government, industry, and university
funding decisions. The few existing studies of consulting suggest that it is an important fac-
tor in the intellectual exchange between the academy and industry. For example, Cohen et
al. (1998) ﬁnd that industrial managers often consider consulting to be more important than
either patents or licensing for transferring knowledge from universities. In his survey, Mans-
ﬁeld (1995) found the reverse spillover (from ﬁrm projects to university research) provided
beneﬁts for faculty members’ government supported research.
We develop a theoretical model of consulting which incorporates faculty decisions on the
allocation of research time between their university lab and a ﬁrm’s lab, as well as govern-
ment and ﬁrm decisions on funding for the researcher’s work within the university. We then
exploit a unique database of funding, publications, and patents for 458 faculty inventors to
estimate parameters of the model. The use of individual data, combined with the theory,
provides new insights on the interface between university and industry research. In particu-
lar, we ﬁnd evidence that government research funding increases faculty consulting on ﬁrm
research projects, independent of faculty quality, and that government and industry funding
for faculty research within the university are strategic complements (again independent of
quality eﬀects).
The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a government agency and ﬁrm simultane-
ously choose funding levels for a researcher’s university research project. This is followed
by another simultaneous-move game in which the ﬁrm chooses a unit consulting fee, and
the faculty researcher decides how much time to consult for the ﬁrm on its project. The
model yields predictions for the time spent consulting and the associated fee and the level
2of government and industry support for university research.
We allow for diﬀerences in faculty quality and/or academic reputation, as well as diﬀer-
ences in the scientiﬁc merit of projects within the university and ﬁr m . R e s e a r c ho nb o t h
projects is uncertain. The ﬁrm can beneﬁt from university research in several ways. It
can license results from a successful university research project, but regardless of success or
whether the ﬁrm funded university research, it can beneﬁt from the researcher’s expertise if
it hires her to consult. Thus we allow for R&D spillovers in the sense that the researcher’s
work on government funded research can enhance her probability of success in the ﬁrm’s
consulting project. We also incorporate the notion that consulting on the ﬁrm’s project
can provide insights of use in her university research. Finally, the university supports the
researcher’s internal research through its infrastructure or some base level of funding.
The faculty researcher cares about reputation as well as income, so that the amount of
time that she is willing to consult can be increasing or decreasing in the fee depending on
her tradeoﬀ between income and reputation, as well as her attitude toward risk. While in
general the model’s predictions depend on this relationship, several results hold regardless
of the consulting supply function. In particular, increases in either the license revenue the
university receives from her university project or her share of that revenue lead her to spend
less time consulting.
The university-industry spillover allows the ﬁrm to free ride on university infrastructure.
The eﬀects of these spillovers, as well as the eﬀects of changes in government and industry
funding depend on the slope of the consulting supply function. However, in the absence of the
university-industry spillover, increases in government funding and the university’s internal
research support reduce the time spent consulting regardless of the slope. It is this result
that we exploit in our empirical analysis to test for such spillovers. Conversely, the reverse
(industry-university) spillover allows the researcher to free ride on ﬁrm infrastructure in her
university project, which leads to less consulting and a higher fee in equilibrium.
In the funding stage, obtaining unambiguous results requires additional assumptions in
large part because of the ambiguous eﬀects of funding on consulting in the presence of
spillovers. Thus, in general, government and ﬁrm funding for research within the university
can be strategic substitutes or complements. Nonetheless, if an increase in either type of
funding increases the marginal eﬀect of the other on the probability that the researcher’s
university project will be successful, then we can provide suﬃcient conditions for government
and ﬁrm funding to act as strategic complements. In this case, an increase in university
internal research support, license revenue, or the researchers share of license revenue all lead
to increased government and ﬁrm funding for the researcher in equilibrium.
It is important to note that, while we assume the university project is more basic than
3the ﬁrm’s, we follow Mansﬁeld (1995) in focusing on consulting projects with some scientiﬁc
merit. It is this feature of our analysis that allows us to overcome a major barrier to
examining consulting empirically - that is, a lack of data on consulting time or fees. We
employ a unique data set of nearly 1679 patents on which 458 faculty from eight major
US universities are listed as inventors. Thirty percent of these patents are assigned to
ﬁrms. In interviews with faculty and university licensing professionals, as well as industry
R&D executives, the major reason given for faculty patents assigned to ﬁrms was consulting
(Thursby et al. 2009). We exploit this information and use ﬁrm-assigned faculty patents as a
measure of consulting activity. This measure captures only a subset of consulting outcomes
by omitting projects that do not result in patents, but is important for our purposes because
those consulting projects that result in patents clearly have scientiﬁcm e r i t .O u rd a t aa l s o
include each individual’s government and industry research funding by year, which allows us
to provide estimates for both stages of the model.
In general, the empirical results support the theory. Results for the consulting stage
support our assumptions that university research projects are more basic than ﬁrm projects
and that there are spillovers from the researcher’s university project to ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that
consulting is positively associated with government funding and our measures of university
research support. In the context of the model, this result occurs only with spillovers from
the faculty researcher’s government sponsored research to the ﬁrm’s research. In the funding
stage, we ﬁnd that government and industrial funding are strategic complements. In this
case, the model implies that universities can use their research infrastructure to increase
both types of funding, and indeed we ﬁnd strong empirical support for this eﬀect.
This is one of only a few studies to examine consulting either theoretically or empirically.
The aforementioned surveys by Mansﬁeld (1995) and Cohen et al. (1998) are notable excep-
tions. To our knowledge, the only theoretical studies of consulting are Beath et al. (2003)
which examines the potential for budget-constrained universities to relax the constraint by
encouraging faculty to consult and Dechenaux et al. (2009) which examines consulting as
one of the mechanisms for inducing faculty inventors to collaborate in development needed
for commercial success of inventions licensed from the university (Jensen and Thursby 2001).
The latter diﬀers markedly from this paper since the consulting considered is ex post devel-
opment from a project started in the university rather than ex ante research by a faculty
member on an industrial project.
The license share result in the theory is of particular note since it contributes to policy
debates on the impact of licensing and other commercial opportunities on faculty research.
The policy concern is that the opportunity to earn license revenue would divert faculty
into applied work or research with little scientiﬁc merit. Empirical research examining this
4issue has been unable to ﬁnd such an eﬀect and in some cases, has found increased research
in response to licensing (Azoulay et al. 2007, 2009; Thursby and Thursby 2009b). Our
theoretical result provides a rationale for these ﬁndings since an increased share of license
r e v e n u ew i l li n c r e a s et i m es p e n to nt h eu n i v e rsity research project as well as funding for
the research. Moreover, if the university research project has more scientiﬁc merit than the
ﬁrm’s, the increased share actually leads to an increase in fundamental research.1
We also contribute to the literature on the relationship between government and industry
funding of research, which has primarily focused on the complementarity or substitutability
of public and private funding of R&D conducted by ﬁrms (David and Hall 2000; David et
al. 2000). We focus on funding for research within universities, and show that government
and industry funding are strategic complements. In our model, this occurs because each
type of funding improves the marginal impact of the other in the presence of spillovers,
independent of the faculty member’s reputation or quality. Thus our results diﬀer markedly
from empirical studies of university level data which interpret a positive relationship between
government and other funding as the result of the other sources taking federal funding as
a signal of high quality research (Connolly 1997; Blume-Kohaut et al. 2009). Neither our
theory nor empirics rely on signaling.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on spillovers from university research to industrial
patenting. Our empirical approach of identifying faculty contributions to industrial patenting
by ﬁrm-assigned patents on which faculty are inventors shows that spillovers are greater than
those identiﬁed by the common practice of examining citations in ﬁrm-assigned patents to
university-assigned patents (Jaﬀe 1989; Jaﬀe et al. 1993; Henderson et al. 1998).2 In this
regard, our work is closest to Thursby et al. (2009) which uses the same empirical approach
to show that 26% of a sample of 5811 patents with faculty inventors from 87 US universities
were assigned solely to ﬁrms. That work diﬀers in that it is purely empirical and focuses
on assignment as a function of patent and university characteristics rather than individual
inventor characteristics or research funding.
Section 2 describes the research technology and player preferences and Section 3 presents
the two stage game. Section 4 presents the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
of all propositions and the data description are given in Appendices A and B, respectively.
1Increased basic research in response to license incentives can be shown in other contexts (Jensen et al.
2003; Thursby et al. 2007; and Lach and Schankerman 2008).
2For a similar point in a European context see Crespi et al.(2006), Geuna and Nesta (2006), and Saragossi
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003).
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Our goal is to develop a theory to explain consulting as a mechanism for spillovers between
university and industry research projects. For simplicity, we consider one faculty researcher,
one ﬁrm interested in capitalizing on faculty expertise, and one government funding agency.
We incorporate the fact that faculty diﬀer in quality, which we represent by an observable
variable q deﬁn e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,Q] such that higher values of q correspond to greater
research capability.
2.1 Research Technology
Although there are many dimensions on which one can categorize research, for the purposes
of this analysis it is most useful to think in terms of the pure scientiﬁc component of a given
research problem. Thus, we assume research problems can be characterized by a variable x,
deﬁn e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,X], such that higher values of x correspond to research that has
greater scientiﬁcm e r i ta n di si n h e r e n t l ym o r ed i ﬃcult to solve.
Successfully solving a given research problem can generate multiple outputs of value to the
researcher, university, government funding agency, and/or industrial sponsor. These can be
generally thought of as those results of research that contribute to the scientiﬁcr e p u t a t i o n s
and commercial payoﬀs associated with solving the problem, such as publications, citations,
patents, and proﬁts. The likelihood that a research project succeeds depends on a number
of factors, including the nature of the problem to be solved (how fundamental or basic it is),
the quality of the researcher, and the level of funding available.
For simplicity, we think of the researcher as working on a single research problem within
the university, which has scientiﬁcm e r i txI, with the possibility of also working outside the
university as a consultant on a ﬁrm’s research problem, which has scientiﬁcm e r i txO,w h e r e
xI >x O. While this assumption is not necessary for our results, it is consistent with the
bulk of the literature on university industry collaboration (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994 and
1996; Mowery and Teece 1996; Lacetera 2009). Assume that T is the total time available in
the period, and that M is the (maximum) amount of time that she can spend consulting,
M<T .3 If t is the time she contracts to consult with the ﬁrm, t ∈ (0,M],t h e nT −t is the
time she spends on her own research project in the university. If she does not consult, t =0 ,
3Most funding agencies and universities will not allow researchers to sell more than 100% of their time,
s oad e c i s i o nt oc o n s u l tf o rt h eﬁrm in its research lab on its project clearly means that the researcher will
not be spending all of her time on her university project. Indeed, if she chose to so this after accepting, for
example, federal funding for the entire year, then the granting agency would undoubtedly adjust their level
of funding for her to adjust for this.
6then she works all of the time T on her own university research.4
We model research as an uncertain production process in which the “production function”
is a probability of success function. We assume that the probability of success in solving
any speciﬁc research problem of scientiﬁcm e r i tx undertaken by a researcher of quality
q is p(τ,e;q,x), where τ represents the time the researcher devotes to the project, and e
represents her eﬀective funding on that project. From the production perspective, it is
natural to assume that p is increasing and strictly concave in (τ, e, q), so these “inputs”
have positive but diminishing marginal productivities. It is also natural to assume that these
inputs are complements, so the second order cross-partial derivatives of p with respect to
them are all positive. For example, the marginal eﬀect of an additional hour of research on
the probability a project will succeed should be greater for researchers with higher quality
or greater levels of funding. Our assumption that it is more diﬃcult to solve problems with
greater scientiﬁc merit implies p is decreasing in x, and it also natural to assume that this
diﬃculty increases at a increasing rate, ∂2p/∂x2 < 0. We also assume that a more diﬃcult
project reduces the marginal eﬀect on the probability of success of time, eﬀective funding,
and quality, so that the cross-partial derivatives with respect to x and each of the inputs are
negative.
It is important to discuss in more detail what we mean by “eﬀective” research funding.
A common approach to incorporate spillovers in models of R&D is to deﬁne eﬀort as the
sum of all expenditures on R&D, including spillovers (see DeBondt 1997). We take a similar
approach and allow for spillovers between research projects by including eﬀective funding in
the probability of success functions.
The researcher has several sources of potential support for her university research. One
is university infrastructure and knowledge base, KI. She can also obtain sponsored research
funds from a government agency, G, and/or industrial ﬁrm, F. Finally, if she consults for a
ﬁrm, then there may be spillovers to her university research.
The ﬁrm’s research project is conducted within its own lab, where KO represents its
infrastructure and knowledge base. The unit cost of consulting paid by the ﬁrm is c,s oct is
the ﬁrm’s expenditure on consulting (and the researcher’s consulting income)
Thus, we deﬁne eﬀective funding on the researcher’s project in the university as
eI = KI + G + F + λK0 if t > 0 (1a)
= KI + G + Fi f t =0
4This implicitly assumes that our heroine is an obsessive-compulsive workaholic who prefers her own
research to all forms of leisure activity. This interpretation is perhaps an over-simpliﬁcation, but it highlights
the stylized fact that most researchers view their own research as a consumption good.
7where λ ∈ [0,1) is the spillover parameter representing the extent to which her consulting
experience can contribute to her university research. Spillovers from consulting to university
research are a function of the ﬁrm’s knowledge base.
Analogously, we deﬁne eﬀective funding for the ﬁrm’s project as
eO = KO + F + β(KI + G)+ct if t > 0 (1b)
= KO + Fi f t =0 ,
where β ∈ [0,1) is the spillover parameter representing the extent to which her university
research experience can contribute to solving the ﬁrm’s problem. This approach assumes
that when the ﬁrm hires a university researcher as a consultant, what she contributes to
the project is a function of the knowledge from her government and university supported
research. It also embodies the idea that the ﬁrm funds university research both to obtain
results with commercial potential and to enhance the ﬁrm’s own internal research problems
(Thompson 2003).
2.2 Preferences and Payoﬀs
In general, we think of faculty as deriving utility from the prestige associated with their
research as well as the income it generates (Stephan 1996). Therefore, we assume that
faculty utility at any date is U(R,W),w h e r eR is her current stock of academic (scientiﬁc)
reputation and W is her current wealth stock.5 Marginal utility in reputation is positive and
diminishing, while marginal utility of wealth is positive and nondecreasing (we allow for the
case of risk neutrality to clarify which results do not depend on risk-aversion). Let Rs denote
her reputation if she successfully solves her university research problem in this period. We
assume Rs is an increasing function of xI, because successful solution of a research problem
of greater scientiﬁc merit results in greater enhancement of her reputation.6 Let Rf denote
her reputation if she fails to solve the problem in this period. This is also her reputational
stock at the beginning of the period, when the funding agency and ﬁrm make their funding
decisions. Thus, conditional on success Rs − Rf > 0 is the ﬂow of reputation in this stage
(conditional on success). Deﬁne A as her wealth stock at the beginning of the period plus
her university salary minus savings, that is her current net assets (i.e., net of savings and
non-innovation income). Also assume that γ is her share of license revenue paid to the
5An alternative approach would be to assume utility depends on the time spent in each type of research
and the prestige of each type of research stock, as in Jensen and Thursby (2004). In the approach we take
h e r e ,t h et i m es p e n ti ne a c ht y p eo fr e s e a r c he ﬀects her expected utility, but only through the probability of
success.
6For notational convenience, we do not write this functional dependence explicitly except when necessary.
8university for a success, L ≥ 0. Then current wealth is Ws = A + γL+ ct for success and
Wf = A + ct for failure, forms which emphasize the ﬂow income from university invention
and consulting. The researcher’s expected utility is then
EU(G,F,t,c)=p(T − t,eI;q,xI)U(Rs,W s) (2)
+[1 − p(T − t,eI;q,xI)]U(Rf,W f).
This approach allows us to focus on any given stage in the life cycle of this researcher. From
her perspective, the results that follow depend on the stage of the life cycle only to the extent
that they depend on the relative magnitudes of R and W.7
The government funding agency is primarily interested in advancing basic scientiﬁcr e -
search, so its utility, Ug, depends upon the scientiﬁc reputational stock associated with the
research it has funded. Because there are alternative uses for its research budget, namely
other researchers’ projects, its net expected utility, EUg, from funding her project is the
expected utility of its reputation less the utility loss V from not funding alternative projects.
Its net expected utility from devoting G to this project is then
EUg(G,F,t,c)=p(T − t,eI;q,xI)Ug(Rgs) (3)
+[1 − p(T − t,eI;q,xI)]Ug(Rgf) − V (G)
where Rgs is its reputational stock if she succeeds in her university project, and Rgf is its
reputational stock at the beginning of the period. We also assume Rgs is an increasing
function of xI. The agency does not get reputational credit for her success if it does not fund
her: Rgs >R gf if and only if G>0. Note that an increase in the researcher’s consulting time
unambiguously decreases the funding agency’s expected utility by reducing the probability
of success in her university project.
Finally, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt arises from both its own research problem and the
university research that it funds. Let πI denote ﬁrm proﬁt from funding the researcher’s
university project if it succeeds and π denote the proﬁt from its own research project if it
succeeds. Then expected proﬁti s
EΠ(G,F,t,c)=p(T − t,eI;q,xI)(πI − L) − F + p(t,eO;q,xO)π − ct.( 4 )
7This approach abstracts from the savings and salary determination decisions, but the additional com-
plexity from endogenizing them would not add value to the analysis. As we show below, the stage of the
life-cycle matters only to the extent that varying the relative stocks of R and W over time might change the
sign of ∂2U/∂R∂W, and so possibly the direction of shift of her best reply function in response to changes
in some of the parameters of the model in the consulting subgame.
9This form implicitly assumes the ﬁrm will only fund her university project if it obtains an
option to license a success from the project, and that it is not interested in licensing successful
projects developed without its funding. This form also shows the trade-oﬀ in the probability
of success of each project as her time spent consulting changes.
To save notation, we let pI denote p(T −t,eI;q,xI) and pO denote p(t,eO;q,xO) whenever
their meanings are clear.
3 The Funding Game
We adopt a game structure that conforms to the stylized fact that faculty typically prefer
their own research to other projects (Aghion et al. 2008), and therefore focus on obtaining
funds for their research before making any agreements to consult on the ﬁrm’s research
project. Thus, the game has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the researcher seeks support for
her university research project from both the government funding agency and the ﬁrm. The
agency and the ﬁrm then simultaneously choose funding levels for her project. After these
decisions are made and revealed, but before the success or failure of the university research
project is observed, another simultaneous-move game follows in which the ﬁrm chooses a
unit consulting fee, and the researcher decides how much time to consult for the ﬁrm.8
Two comments about this approach are in order. First, it assumes that the funding
agency and ﬁrm can pre-commit to providing funds for the researcher’s university project.9
It also assumes that researchers cannot be treated as agents who must accept take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers. That is, we consider the behavior of scientists whose expertise and reputation
gives them more “market power” than workers in a principal-agent model with a perfectly
elastic supply of labor.
3.1 Stage Two Equilibrium
In the second stage the researcher chooses her consulting time t and the ﬁrm chooses its unit
consulting fee c, given the values of funding for university research chosen in stage one, F
and G. In Appendix A, we state and prove the formal result for existence of an equilibrium
in this game, (t∗(G,F),c ∗(G,F)).10
8This approach also conforms to the “standard” academic year of nine months in which faculty are paid
by the university, followed by three summer months in which faculty are free to pursue external funding
options.
9This approach is similar to that in Lacetera (2009), who assumes that ﬁrms commit to university research
as a way of funding basic research.
10These equilibrium values are also functions of all the parameters of the model
(α,β,q,xI,KI,xO,KO,S,L,γ). Although a minor abuse of notation, we omit these as arguments of the
10Choosing t to maximize EU(G,F,t,c) yields a best reply function ˆ t(c) for the researcher,
which deﬁnes the consulting time that maximizes her expected utility for any unit consulting
fee chosen by the ﬁrm. This is essentially her consulting supply function. Similarly, choosing
c to maximize EΠ(G,F,t,c) yields a best reply function ˆ c(t) for the ﬁrm11,w h i c hd e ﬁnes the
unit consulting fee that maximizes its expected proﬁt for any time in consulting chosen by
the researcher. This is essentially its (inverse) consulting demand function. The equilibria
of this game are more easily understood using diagrams of these best reply functions (see
Figures 1 and 2).
Because we are interested in deriving testable implications, we focus on the Nash equi-
librium when it is interior,12 in which case it must satisfy
∂EU(G,F,t∗,c ∗)
∂t

























tπ − t.( 6 b )
In this case, the best reply functions are implicitly deﬁned by setting (6a) and (6b) each
equal to zero.
Examples of this equilibrium are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. To interpret the equilibrium
conditions in (5), consider the expressions for marginal utility and marginal proﬁti n(6).
From (6b),a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec o n s ulting fee increases eﬀective funding eO,a n dt h e r e f o r e
increases the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt, so it increases the fee as long it is less than the marginal
increase in expected proﬁt. Because the ﬁrm’s best reply is its inverse demand function, we
functions for clarity of exposition.
11We omit the parameters of the model as explicit arguments of ˆ t(c) and ˆ c(t) for clarity of exposition.
12These results provide some information about corner solutions as well. For example, a change that
increases consulting time in an interior equilibrium is more likely to induce a researcher oﬀ the no-consulting









to insure that this demand curve, and the ﬁrm’s best reply function, are negatively sloped.
Further note that, because eﬀective funding eO also depends on funding for the researcher’s
university project, (6b) shows how spillovers from basic university research can inﬂuence the
ﬁrm’s unit consulting fee, and so whether our heroine actually consults.
Devoting more time to consulting has two conﬂicting eﬀects on the researcher’s expected
utility. First, for any fee, more time in consulting increases her income, whether or not either
research project succeeds, as shown by the second term in (6a).H o w e v e r ,t h eﬁrst term in
(6a) shows that diverting more time to consulting also decreases her expected utility by
decreasing the probability of success in university research, and thus the probability of the
resulting reputational enhancement and license revenue. If the expected loss of utility from
diverting any time to consulting is too high, then she will not do so. Otherwise, she increases
time in consulting until the marginal gain in expected utility from consulting income is oﬀset
by this marginal expected loss in her university research.
Appendix A shows that she does not consult for free. At c =0 , the expected mar-
ginal utility from consulting is negative, because diverting time from her university project
decreases its probability of success and expected utility without providing any additional in-
come in return, so ˆ t(0) = 0. However, her expected marginal utility is increasing in the fee at




















∂Y 2 +( 1− pI)
∂2U(Rf,W f)
∂Y 2 ],( 8 )
the slope of her best reply depends, in general, on both the elasticity of the probability of
success in university research with respect to time spent consulting and her attitude toward
risk.
Theorem 1 When the researcher’s best reply is interior, ˆ t(c) ∈ (0,M), her best reply func-
tion for consulting time is increasing if she is risk-neutral or not too risk-averse, and if the




∂τ ≤ 1. However, it can be negatively sloped if this probability is elastic
and/or she is suﬃciently risk-averse.
As we show in the appendix, consulting occurs in equilibrium only if her best reply
is positively sloped initially (i.e., ˆ t0(c) > 0 for the lowest c such that ˆ t(c) > 0). It may
12remain positively sloped for all relevant fees. However, as the fee and her certain income
increase, her best reply may eventually bend back, becoming negatively sloped thereafter.
This can happen if the probability of success in her university research is elastic and/or she
is suﬃciently risk-averse. Therefore, at equilibrium, her best reply can be either positively
or negatively sloped, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2.13
Comparative statics results depend not only on these slopes, but also on the direction in
which the best-reply functions shift. For some parametric changes, the direction of shift in
the researcher’s best reply depends on how her marginal utility of income varies as a function
of her academic reputation. To abstract from this question, we assume hereafter that her
utility is additively separable, U(R,W)=f(R)+g(W),w h e r ef0(R) > 0 >f 00(R) for all
R ≥ 0 and g0(W) > 0 >g 00(W) for all W ≥ 0.14 This allows us to state the comparative
statics of the consulting subgame equilibria as follows.
Theorem 2 In the equilibrium of the second stage consulting subgame:
( i )A ni n c r e a s ei nl i c e n s er e v e n u eL or her share γ of it decreases consulting time and
increases the consulting fee.
(ii) An increase in the diﬃculty xO of the ﬁrm’s project decreases the fee and decreases
(increases) consulting if her best reply is positively (negatively) sloped.
(iii) An increase in q increases the fee and, if her best reply is negatively sloped, decreases
consulting.
(iv) An increase in government funding G, industrial funding F, or the research support KI
provided by the university:
(a) Decreases consulting but has an ambiguous eﬀect on the fee if her best reply is positively
sloped.
(b) Must either decrease consulting, decrease the fee, or both, if her best reply is negatively
sloped.
(v) An increase in the research support KO provided by the ﬁrm has an ambiguous eﬀect on
fee, but decreases consulting if her best reply is positively sloped.
(vi) An increase in her net assets A increases consulting time and decreases the fee if she is
risk neutral.
These results are easily seen from the ﬁgures. An increase in either license revenue L or
the researcher’s share of it γ has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s best reply, but shifts hers to the left
13There is, of course, the possibility that her best reply not only intersects the ﬁrm’s when it is increasing,
but also turns down so sharply that it intersects the ﬁrm’s again from above. In this case, however, the
latter equilibrium is not locally stable, so we do not consider it.




∂Y , which simply says that her marginal utility of income does not increase when her
university research project succeeds.
13because she chooses to consult less for any given fee. Thus, in equilibrium, consulting time t∗
decreases and the fee c∗ increases. That is, our model predicts that the potential for income
from their own university research would lead faculty to substitute time in university research
for consulting. This result has important implications for the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave
rights from governmentally funded patents to universities and their researcher-inventors, and
so was equivalent to an increase in L and γ. Our analysis shows that, whatever the slope of
the researcher’s consulting supply, and whatever the stage of the life cycle, passage of this
act would have reduced consulting. Although scholars and policy makers have expressed
concern that this act may have led to less fundamental research, our analysis implies there
is no reason to expect such an eﬀect. This may explain the failure of empirical studies to
ﬁnd this eﬀect (Azoulay et al. 2007, 2009; Thursby and Thursby 2009b). We emphasize that
this result does not depend on the assumption that her utility is separable.
Next, an increase in xO has no eﬀect on the researcher’s best reply, but the ﬁrm is willing
to pay less per unit of time for her as a consultant, so its best reply shifts down. Consulting
time decreases when her best reply is positively sloped, and increases when it is negatively
sloped. In either case, the fee decreases. This result also does not depend on the assumption
that her utility is separable.
An increase in her stock of assets A leads her to consult more for any fee if she is risk-
neutral (or not too risk-averse), so her best reply shifts right. This has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s
willingness to pay for her as a consultant, so consulting time increases and the fee decreases.
The results for G, F, KI,a n dKO assume that there are spillovers, λ>0 and β>0.W e
therefore defer this discussion until after the following result on spillovers.
Theorem 3 In the equilibrium of the second stage consulting subgame:
( i )A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee x t e n tβ to which her university research spills over into consulting
decreases the fee, and decreases (increases) consulting, if her best reply is positively (nega-
tively) sloped.
(ii) An increase in the extent λ to which consulting spills over into her university research
decreases consulting time and increases the fee.
(iii) In the special case of β =0 , an increase in government funding G or the research sup-
port KI provided by the university decreases consulting and increases the fee.
(iv) In the special case of λ =0 , an increase in the research support KO provided by the ﬁrm
in its lab decreases the fee and decreases (increases) consulting if her best reply is positively
(negatively) sloped.
An increase in the extent of spillovers to consulting β has no eﬀect on her best reply.
The ﬁrm is willing to pay her less per unit of time because it beneﬁts more by free-riding
14on university infrastructure, so its best reply shifts down. The eﬀect depends on the slope
of her best reply: consulting decreases, but the fee increases (decreases) when her best reply
is negatively (positively) sloped. Because her best reply does not shift, this result does not
depend on assuming that her utility is separable. An increase in the extent of spillovers from
consulting λ has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s best reply. However, because her university research
beneﬁts from free-riding on the ﬁrm’s infrastructure increase, she is willing to consult less
for any given fee, so her best reply shifts left. Therefore, in equilibrium, consulting decreases
and the fee increases.
It is important to understand how changes in the levels of government and industrial
funding chosen in stage one inﬂuence the stage-two consulting equilibrium. An increase in
either G or F shifts the ﬁrm’s best reply down, because it is willing to pay less for consulting.
These increases shift the researcher’s best reply left, because she is willing to consult less.
When her best reply is positively sloped, consulting time must decrease, but the eﬀect on
the fee is ambiguous, depending upon the relative magnitudes of these shifts. When her best
reply is negatively sloped, the ultimate changes in both consulting and the fee are ambiguous.
However, when the equilibrium is locally stable ,a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 ,t h e nb o t he q u i l i b r i u m
values cannot increase, or even remain constant. Either consulting or the fee must decrease.
If there are no spillovers from the university, β =0 ,t h e nt h eﬁrm’s best reply does not
shift in response to a change in G. In this case, an increase in G decreases consulting and
increases the fee. The analysis for an increase in the university infrastructure KI is the same
as that for G.
Finally, an increase in the ﬁrm’s infrastructure KO shifts the ﬁrm’s best reply down.
Spillovers from consulting back to university research increase her productivity there, and
so the opportunity cost of consulting. An increase in KO therefore leads her to spend less
time consulting for any fee, so her best reply shifts left. As stated in Theorem 2,t h ee ﬀect
on the fee is ambiguous, but consulting decreases when her best reply is positively sloped.
If there are no such spillovers, λ =0 , then her best reply does not shift, so the fee decreases
and the eﬀect on consulting depends on the slope of her best reply: it increases (decreases)
if her best reply is negatively (positively) sloped. Again, because her best reply does not
shift, this result does not depend on assuming her utility is separable.
3.2 Stage One Equilibrium
In the ﬁrst stage, the government funding agency and the ﬁrm simultaneously choose funding
levels for the researcher’s university project. As assumed above, the ﬁrm allocates a ﬁxed
amount Bf > 0 to R&D, and does not make major adjustments until the next budget cycle.
15Similarly, it is realistic to assume that the research budget of the government funding agency
is also ﬁxed at the level Bg > 0 during this period. To determine subgame perfect equilibria,
we assume these funding choices are made subject to equilibrium behavior in stage two
embedded in the equilibrium functions t∗(G,F) and c∗(G,F). Substituting these into (3)







∗(G,F)).( 1 0 )
By construction, a Nash equilibrium (G∗,F∗) of the simultaneous-move game with these
payoﬀs is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage funding game. Appendix A formally
states and proves existence of an equilibrium in this game, (G∗,F∗).15
Maximization of (9) by choosing G ∈ [0,B g] implicitly deﬁnes a best reply function ˆ G(F),
giving the level of government funding for university research that maximizes the agency’s
expected utility for any choice of funding F by the ﬁrm. Similarly, maximization of (10)
by choosing F ∈ [0,B f] implicitly deﬁnes a best reply function ˆ F(G), giving the level of
industrial funding for university research that maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt for any
funding level chosen by the government agency.16 Again, however, because we are interested
in deriving empirical implications, we focus on the interior equilibrium.











































π.( 1 2 b )
15Again, these equilibrium values are also functions of all the parameters of the model
(α,β,q,xI,KI,xO,KO,S,L, γ).
16We omit the parameters of the model as explicit arguments in these best reply functions for clarity of
exposition.
16These conditions show both the initial marginal trade-oﬀs between the beneﬁts and costs
of funding, and the eﬀects of initial funding choices on the second stage equilibrium values.
Notice that the agency’s payoﬀ does not depend on c∗,a n dﬁrm’s second stage optimal choice
of c∗ eliminates its eﬀect on the ﬁrst stage funding choice (via a standard envelope theorem
application). An example of this equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.
Conditions (11a) and (12a) show that increases in government funding directly increase
eﬀective funding eI, and thus both the probability of success and expected utility, so the
agency increases G until this marginal increase in expected utility from this project is oﬀset






∂G > 0 if ∂t∗
∂G < 0, in which case it follows from (12a) that the agency’s best reply is
interior as long as the opportunity cost of funding our heroine is not too high. The conditions
in (11b) and (12b) show that devoting more funds to our heroines’s university research has
conﬂicting eﬀects for the ﬁrm. First, it increases the probability of success in university
research, and expected licensing proﬁt. However, if ∂t∗
∂F < 0, this reduces time in consulting,
and therefore the probability of success in and expected proﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s project. In
this case, the ﬁrm funds university research as long as the increase in expected proﬁtf r o m
licensing a success from the university project outweighs the expected proﬁtl o s sf r o mi t s
own project.
Given the general ambiguity of ∂t∗
∂G and ∂t∗
∂F,i ti sd i ﬃcult to obtain comparative statics
results on equilibrium levels of funding for university research. Indeed, even the slopes of
the government and ﬁrm best reply functions are not obvious. Nevertheless, we can obtain



















> 0 for j = G,F.( 1 3 b )
These conditions essentially state that a stage-one increase in one type of external funding in-
creases the marginal eﬀect of the other type of external funding on the stage-two equilibrium
probability of success in university research, in which case we can show the following.
Theorem 4 Assume that equilibrium consulting time is decreasing in ﬁrm funding, ∂t∗
∂F < 0,
that (13) holds, and that second-order eﬀects on equilibrium consulting times are negligible,
∂2t∗
∂i∂j ≈ 0, for all parameters i and j.T h e n :
(i) The ﬁrst-stage best reply function of the funding agency is positively sloped.
(ii) The ﬁrst-stage best reply function of the ﬁrm is positively sloped if, in addition, an
17increase in government funding decreases equilibrium consulting time, ∂t∗
∂G < 0,a n ds u f -










Two points should be noted. First, the conditions in (13) and a negative eﬀect of ﬁrm
funding on equilibrium time spent consulting are suﬃcient for the government’s best reply
function to be positively sloped. Second, the additional hypotheses in (ii) of this theorem
states that, although there are spillovers from university research to the ﬁrm’s project, they
cannot outweigh the reduced time the researcher spends in consulting if G increases, so
equilibrium eﬀective funding e∗
O for the ﬁrm’s project decreases. This guarantees that an
increase in G also results in a decrease in the marginal eﬀect of F on the stage-two equilibrium
probability of success in the ﬁrm’s consulting project.
When the best reply functions are positively sloped, as depicted in Figure 3, we can
identify some comparative statics results for the ﬁrst stage.
Theorem 5 Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4, if the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium is locally sta-
ble, then an increase in research funding within the university, license revenue, or her share
of it must increase equilibrium university research funding from both the government and
the ﬁrm (∂G∗
∂j > 0 and ∂F∗
∂j > 0 for j = KI,L,γ) if, in addition, this suﬃciently decreases










An increase in the level of university research support, license revenue, or her share of
it shifts the agency’s best reply up, which must increase funding for her university research
from both external sources. In each of these cases, the additional hypothesis is suﬃcient,
but not necessary, to guarantee that the ﬁrm’s best reply shifts right. Because each of








∂τ∂eO states that this eﬀect is either negative, or not too positive. All
other changes are ambiguous in this case.
4 Econometric Analysis
In this Section we focus on empirical estimates of the two stages of the model. While the
ideal data would include time spent in consulting and the fee paid, to our knowledge such
data are not available. However, because our interest is in consulting that is essentially
research in ﬁrm labs, we are able to exploit a unique data set of 1679 patents on which 458
faculty from eight major US universities are listed as inventors. A patent lists, not only the
18inventors, but also the patent’s assignee(s) (that is the patent’s owner(s)). By institutional
policies, both ﬁrms and universities typically claim ownership of inventions resulting from
projects in their labs.17 In our data, thirty percent of the patents are assigned to ﬁrms. In a
series of interviews with faculty, university licensing professionals, and ﬁrm R&D executives,
we were told that such assignments are almost exclusively the result of faculty consulting in
ﬁrm labs.18 Thus we take ﬁrm assignment as our proxy for consulting. While this measure
ignores consulting that does not lead to patents, it clearly indicates inventorship on ﬁrm
projects, such as those in our theory, which have scientiﬁcm e r i t .
The eight universities in our sample are Cornell, Georgia Institute of Technology, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue, Stanford, Texas A & M, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin. For each of the faculty at these universities in 1993, we have detailed annual information
on faculty publications, citations and research funding. We restrict attention to faculty in
years in which they applied for a patent that was granted between 1993 and 1999. This
yields 1679 patent/inventor pairs where assignment of the patent is either to the university
or to a ﬁrm of which 1532 are unique patents.19 Details on our selection process are provided
in Appendix B. When there are two or more faculty inventors on a patent we randomly drop
the duplicate patents so that we consider each patent once in our econometric analysis.
The reason for focusing on the years in which a faculty member is known to have applied
for a patent is simple. The model we develop is for those faculty who can conceivably consult
with industry. If a university inventor applies in some year for a patent that is subsequently
granted, then clearly some of her work was deemed to be useful, and hence one can argue
that she could have consulted in that year. To maintain comparability across the sample we
also restrict non-consulting observations to those years in which there is an application for a
university-assigned patent. Finally, we use patent characteristics as a measure of the focus
of research. Restricting attention to years with patent applications excludes those faculty
who consulted or could have consulted with industry on non-patentable projects, but, more
to the point, it excludes faculty who were not of interest to industry as consultants.
It is also important to recognize that while the theoretical model yields a number of
17For federally funded inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to claim ownership and for non
federally funded inventions, with rare exception universities claim ownership of inventions using their re-
sources.
18It is also possible that ﬁrm assigned patents are on inventions that should legitimately be assigned to
the university. See Thursby et al. (2009) for an empirical analysis of this issue.
19An u m b e ro ft h eﬁrms in the sample are ﬁrms in which the inventor is a principal (founder, CEO and/or
member of the scientiﬁc advisory board). However, our model does not diﬀerentiate between consulting with
a start-up and consulting with an established ﬁrm thus our empirical analysis does not diﬀerentiate patents
assigned to start-ups from other ﬁrm assigned patents.
Also an additional 80 patents were found but these were either unassigned or they had multiple assignees.
These are not included in the analysis.
19hypotheses that are testable in principle, a number of these concern the consulting fee c∗
which we do not observe. Recall also that a number of results depend on the slope of the
researcher’s consulting supply function or the slopes of the funding best reply functions, and
hence are not testable. Thus some of what follows is properly regarded as estimation of the
system, rather than testing.
4.1 Consulting
For the second stage, we use a logit regression to explain the probability that a patent is
assigned to a university, P(UNIVASSGNi =0 ) , rather than to a ﬁrm, P(UNIVASSGNi =
1),where i refers to a patent/inventor pair. Since assignment of a faculty patent to a ﬁrm
is largely the outgrowth of consulting we interpret the probability of ﬁrm assignment as a
measure of time spent in consulting t∗.
According to our theoretical model, regressors in the logit model should include measures
of government and industry funding, G and F, the researcher’s quality, q, the scientiﬁcm e r i t
of the university and ﬁrm projects, xI and xO, research support provided by the university
and ﬁrm, KI and K0, the inventor’s share γ of university license revenue L,a n dt h et w o
spillover parameters β and λ.O ft h e s ev a r i a b l e sw eh a v ed i r e c tm e a s u r e so n l yf o rKI, G, F,
q,a n dγ.20
While the comparative statics for the consulting stage yield few testable hypotheses, three
that we can test are (i) an increase in γ should decrease t∗, and if there are no spillovers,
i.e., β =0 , then (ii) an increase in either government funding or KI should also decrease t∗.
For each faculty member, we include the faculty member’s yearly total U.S. government
sponsored research funds and the total industry sponsored research funds received in the year
prior to the patent application (LAG_GOV _FND and LAG_IND_FND) as measures
of G and F. This information was provided by the respective university Oﬃce of Sponsored
Programs. For multiple year and/or multiple principle investigator awards, we assume that
expenditures were uniform across years and/or principle investigators.
F o re a c hu n i v e r s i t yw ea l s oh a v ei n f o r m a t i o no nγ, the inventor’s share of university licens-
ing income. If the university has a sliding scale we use the inventor share (INVENTSHARE)
for income between $25k and $50k since the average licensing revenue for an active license
in the US lies between those ﬁgures (AUTM, various years).
As proxies of faculty quality we use the number of publications by the faculty member
in the year prior to the patent application (LAG_PUBS) and the total number of citations
those publications received through 2003 (LAG_PUB_CITES). The data are from ISI
20The aggregate annual amount of licensing revenue by university is available. However, the appropriate
value of L is the licensing revenue earned by the university for that speciﬁc project if it is licensed.
20Web of Science. While citations may indicate inventor quality, it is likely also that faculty
who conduct more fundamental work are cited more (holding constant the number of pub-
lications). Thus LAG_PUB_CITES may reﬂect both inventor quality q and university
project diﬃculty xI.
We have four proxies for university research support KI. First, we use the National Re-
search Council’s (1995) survey measure of the quality of the inventor’s academic department
(DEPT_QUAL) where higher values are assigned to higher quality departments. High
quality departments are generally considered to be relatively resource rich both in terms of
research tools and the knowledge base of faculty colleagues.21 Second, the average number
of university-based co-authors per article (AV ER_CO_AUTHORS)i sar e ﬂection of the
size of the network of the faculty member’s colleagues. The third measure is total univer-
sity research expenditures, in current dollars (UNIV_RD_EXPEND). The ﬁnal measure
reﬂects university teaching loads, which, all else equal, should be negatively related to re-
search. Instead of detailed data on teaching loads we have department level data on the ratio
of full time graduate students to faculty in 1992 (STUDENT_FAC_RATIO) (National
Research Council, 1995). Unfortunately, we do not have information on graduate students
or faculty for other years, however, our prior is that these ﬁgures do not vary substantially
year to year. STUDENT_FAC_RATIO is a better measure of teaching responsibilities
than the alternative university wide student/faculty ratio. This latter measure includes all
university departments instead of just the department of the faculty member whose consult-
ing we wise to examine. All else equal, the higher the graduate student/faculty ratio, the
greater the teaching and advising roles of the faculty. All else, of course, is not equal. In
particular, we need to control for the level of outside research funding of the department. We
include two such controls. The ﬁrst is the ratio of the number of department research grants
to the number of faculty in 1992 (TOT_GRANTS_RATIO) . T h es e c o n di st h er a t i oo f
the department’s total research funding (industry and federal) to the number of faculty in
1992 (TOT_FUNDS_RATIO). TOT_GRANTS_RATIO captures, to some extent, the
breadth of awards while TOT_FUNDS_RATIO captures the level of funding within the
department. Both are measures in the year 1992 since the number of students is also for 1992.
In summary, DEPT_QUAL, AV ER_CO_AUTHORS and UNIV_RD_EXPEND are
each expected to be positively correlated with KI while STUDENT_FAC_RATIO is
expected to be negatively correlated with KI.W ed on o th a v eap r o x yf o rK0.
To control for project diﬃculties xI and xO we use several measures of patent character-
21If DEPT_QUAL and inventor quality q are positively correlated, then DEPT_QUAL can pick up
some of the eﬀects of q. In our data, however, our measures of inventor quality, numbers of publications and
citations, have simple correlations of only 0.141 and 0.209, respectively, with the NRC ranking.
21istics that reﬂect how important and/or fundamental is the patent. More important and/or
fundamental patents are expected to emerge from more diﬃcult (scientiﬁcally meritorious)
problems. Three of the measures are backward looking. The ﬁrst is the number of backward
citations to prior patents (PATENT_CITES) contained in the focal patent. The larger
the number of backward citations the larger is the existing body of related patented work,
so that we would expect patents with more backward citations to be more incremental and
hence of less scientiﬁc merit. The second backward looking measure is the Trajtenberg et al.
(1997) measure of patent originality (ORIGINAL). ORIGINAL is based on a Herﬁndahl
index that reﬂects the dispersion of citations made by the patent across patent classes. The
originality score is higher the wider the range of classes to which the patent makes citations.
A score of zero indicates that all citations to prior art are in a single patent class and scores
close to one indicate citations to many classes. A patent is considered more original if it
cites prior art from many rather than few technology classes. Both PATENT_CITES and
ORIGINAL are from the NBER Patent Database (Hall et al. 2001). We also include as
an additional backward measure the number of non-patent publications cited as prior art in
the patent (ARTICLE_CITES). As a forward looking measure we include the number
of forward citations (FOR_CITES) received by the patent by October 2006. It reﬂects
importance of the patent in the sense that the patent has been considered prior art by either
subsequent inventors or patent examiners. According to our theory, with the exception of
PATENT_CITES the patent characteristics variables should increase the probability of
assignment to the university; PATENT_CITES will decrease the probability.
Additional controls are indicator variables for major program ﬁeld of the inventor:
PHYSCI =1if the inventor is in the physical sciences and ENG =1for engineering
faculty; the excluded category is biological sciences. When university ﬁxed eﬀects are not
included we include an indicator variable for public versus private university (PUBLIC =1
if the university is public) and an indicator variable for whether the university is located
in an urban area (URBAN =1if the university is located in an urban area). Thursby et
al. (2009) suggest that urban areas might provide more opportunities for consulting. Public
universities often are expected to interact with (particularly local) ﬁrms to meet economic
development goals (Thursby et al. 2009, Belonzon and Schankerman 2009).
Finally, controls are included for the inventor’s gender (MALE =1if the inventor is
m a l e )a n da g ea tt h et i m eo ft h ep a t e n ta s s i g n m e n t( AGE). Thursby and Thursby (2007)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in faculty propensity to engage in licensing activities and
Azoulay et al. (2007) ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender eﬀects on faculty patent activity. In our theo-
retical model we show a relationship between inventor assets and consulting. To the extent
that assets rise with age, we expect age and assets to be positively related, so age may be a
22proxy for assets. Thursby et al. (2007) argue that age eﬀects on faculty commercialization
activities are non-linear, so we also include the square of age (AGESQ). In their theoretical
model Thursby et al. ( 2 0 0 7 )s h o wt h a tt e n u r ec a nh a v ead r a m a t i ce ﬀect on faculty licensing.
Unfortunately, we do not know for certain if or when a faculty member obtains tenure, but
we do know the start date at their university. In the event that the “tenure clock” started
when they were ﬁr s te m p l o y e da tt h i su n i v e r s i t yw ec a nm e a s u r et e n u r ea ss t a r t i n gi nt h e
7th year of their employment. TENURE = 1 indicates that the faculty member has tenure
according to our algorithm. Our measure of tenure provides an undercount. Our earliest
observation is for 1989 and the latest is for 1999 with over 92% occurring between 1994 and
1997. To account for any possible change over time in the propensity to consult we include
at i m et r e n d( TREND) equal to 1 for the years 1989-91 and equal to 8 for the year 1998-99.
The early and late years are aggregated because of few observations in the early and late
years.
One hundred and ﬁfty-eight of the patents have more than one faculty inventor. We ran-
domly drop the duplicates so that each patent appears only once in the data. Summary sta-
tistics are found in Table 1 and the logit results in terms of odds ratios are given in Table 2. In
our econometric analysis we use logs of LAG_GOV FND, LAG_INDFND, LAG_PUBS,
LAG_PUB_CITES, PATENT_CITES, ARTICLE_CITES, FOR_CITES,
UNIV_RD_EXPENDand AV ER_CO_AUTHORS. Faculty can appear multiple times
in the data so that cluster standard errors are used to account for potential non-independence
of observations when faculty appear multiple times in the data. In Part A are results for
university ﬁxed eﬀects. In Part B we include PUBLIC, INVENTSHARE and URBAN;
variables which cannot be used in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. Part A is our preferred speci-
ﬁcation since unobserved heterogeneity across universities could lead to bias in all estimated
coeﬃcients in the Part B regression.
Recall from our theoretical analysis that the impact of government funding on consulting
should depend on the existence of spillovers. When β>0, an increase in government funding
G or an increase in university-provided research support KI shifts the researcher’s best reply
back and the ﬁrm’s best reply down, hence the ambiguous theoretical results. When β =0 ,
however, only the researcher’s best reply shifts with an increase in government funding
or university research support, implying a decrease in consulting. Therefore, a positive
empirical relationship between G and consulting or KI and consulting is possible only if
β>0.W h e ns i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero our measures show that higher levels of G and
KI are positively associated with ﬁrm assignment. That is, LAG_GOV FND has an odds
ratio greater than one as does AV ER_CO_AUTHORS. STUDENT_FAC_RATIO,
which is negatively related to KI, has an odds ratio less than one (though it is signiﬁcant
23only in Part A). Thus our results clearly imply positive spillovers from the university to the
ﬁrm. Further, recall from Theorem 2 that with a spillover, an increase in government funding
will increase consulting only when the researcher’s best reply function is negatively sloped in
equilibrium. With a negatively sloped function, the theory also predicts the negative impact
of quality on consulting. In our empirical results lagged publications decrease the probability
of ﬁrm assignment, but the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
To the extent that the peer review process followed by federal agencies identiﬁes the
best researchers, one might argue that government funding is another measure of researcher
quality. However, the eﬀect of additional government funding is opposite that of publications
and industry funding, and the latter variables are clearly measures of researcher quality.
Thus, in these data government funding is a measure of something other than faculty quality.
From the theory, an increase in INVENTSHARE should decrease consulting regardless
of the researcher’s best reply so that the coeﬃcient of INVENTSHARE should be negative.
The correct sign is observed (see Part B), but it is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
However, with only 8 universities in the sample there is little variation in INVENTSHARE.
The coeﬃcients of AGE and AGESQ are neither individually nor jointly signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in either regression.
The patent characteristic variables are consistent with our assumption that university
research projects are more diﬃcult, or fundamental, xI >x 0.S p e c i ﬁcally, the measure of
patent originality (ORIGINAL) is associated with a lower probability of ﬁrm assignment
and it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The larger the number of backward patent citations
(PATENT_CITES) the greater is the likelihood that the patent is assigned to a ﬁrm, thus
the more incremental patents are assigned to the ﬁrm. FOR_CITES is not signiﬁcant in
either regression. Finally, the more citations to journal articles (ARTICLE_CITES)t h e
more likely it is that the patent is assigned to the university. This is the opposite of the eﬀect
of backward patent citations, and, while it might contradict the claim that ﬁrm patents are
more incremental, it is likely only a sign that university inventions are closer to the academic
literature, and thus more basic, than are ﬁrm inventions.
A number of robustness checks were considered; for parsimony, the detailed results are not
presented. We included as a regressor the “expected” number of citations for a researcher’s
publications which is computed as the average number of citations received by articles in the
journals and years in which the researcher’s publications appear. Expected citations are not
signiﬁcant and other results are unchanged. We also considered current year publications,
publication citations, and government and industry funding rather than their lags. The only
change of note is that government funding becomes insigniﬁcant in both models.
244.2 Government and Industry Funding
In our theoretical model, government and industry research funding are simultaneously de-
termined, so the funding stage regressions explain both the amount of government research
funding, GOV _FND, and industry research funds, IND_FND, received by an inventor
in a year in which they applied for a patent. In several of our speciﬁc a t i o n sw ea l s oi n c l u d e
the lagged value of the dependent variable (LAG_GOV _FND or LAG_IND_FND).
As in the consulting stage, we use LAG_PUBS and LAG_PUB_CITES as measures
of inventor quality. Lagged rather than current publications and citations are used to allow
for a lag between funding applications and awards.22 Lagged publications and citations most
likely reﬂect the researcher’s productivity at the time the funding was applied for. While it is
standard to consider citations as a measure of quality, ap r i o r i ,t h e i re ﬀect on funding levels
is not entirely clear because, as we noted above, it is likely that more highly cited faculty
conduct more fundamental research. This is in addition to the fact that the comparative
static eﬀects of quality on funding are ambiguous. Nonetheless, it is important to control
for measures of quality.
Also, as in the consulting stage, when university ﬁxed eﬀects are not included we include
the percentage of licensing revenue the university awards the inventor (INVENTSHARE)
as well as whether the university is public (PUBLIC) and whether it is in an urban area
(URBAN). Our preferred speciﬁcation is the one that has university ﬁxed eﬀects.
The variable SPILL is the number of the inventor’s articles cited as prior art in the
patent. We view this as a measure of the spillover from the inventor’s university research.
If we assume that the researcher’s journal publications result primarily from solving her
university problem, then the larger is SPILL the more the ﬁrm-assigned patent relies on
the inventor’s university research. Given that many of the inventors in our sample have
multiple patents in a year, we randomly select one of the patents to measure the level of
spillover. Note that this measure of β could not be used in the consulting regression because
SPILL is always zero when UNIVASSGN =1 .
For KI we continue to use the three variables DEPT_QUAL, AV ER_CO_AUTHORS,
and UNIV_RD_EXPEND which are expected to be positively associated with KI and
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO is expected to be negatively associated with KI (along with
the controls TOT_GRANTS_RATIO and TOT_FUNDS_RATIO).
To control for funding diﬀerences across ﬁelds we include indicator variables for the major
program area of the inventor (PHYSCI and ENG).
To account for the many zero dependent variable observations we use Tobit models.
22We also considered regressions including one year lags of publications and citations as well as two year
lags. Results are unchanged so we do not present them for the sake of parsimony.
25Because our theoretical model assumes government and industry research funding levels are
simultaneously determined, we use an instrumental variables estimator. Instruments for the
endogenous funding levels are their lagged values. Results are found in Tables 3 and 4. Parts
A and B of each table are speciﬁcations including lagged values of the dependent variable.
In Parts C and D the lagged dependent variable is omitted.
The results for both funding equations suggest that, as in Theorem 4, government and
industry funding within the university are strategic complements. In Table 3, the government
funding regressions, the estimated coeﬃcients of industry funding (INDFND)a r ea l w a y s
positive and, with one exception, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In Table 4, the industry
funding regressions, the coeﬃcient of government funding (GOV FND) is also positive in
each of the speciﬁcations though it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero only in Parts C and
D. All variables are measured in logs so that the estimated coeﬃcients are elasticities and
these estimated elasticities are very small. In other work (Thursby and Thursby 2009a)
we found similar results in a larger dataset that is not conditioned on patenting. In that
work the positive elasticities are always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and are of a similar
size as found in Tables 3 and 4. Recall that in each equation we control for quality of
the individual faculty member using their publications and citations. In each speciﬁcation,
the coeﬃcient of publications is positive and generally signiﬁcant. Thus, to the extent that
these measures adequately capture quality, the complementarity of government and industry
research funding is not driven by quality.
According to Theorem 5, when government and ﬁrm funding are strategic complements,
an increase in university research support KI should increase equilibrium funding from both
the government and the ﬁrm. When the coeﬃcients for our measures of KI are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, they have the correct signs in Tables 3 and 4, with the exception of
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO in the industry funding speciﬁcations which has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect in two speciﬁcations. While, in general, we think of a higher student
faculty ratio as a drain on research, in the case of industry funding one could argue that ﬁrms
fund university research, among other reasons, to gain access to potential hires, suggesting
a positive sign.
Also according to Theorem 5,a ni n c r e a s ei nγ should increase both types of funding in
equilibrium. In each speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient of INVENTSHARE is negative, though
it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (10% level) in only one speciﬁcation. As noted above,
our preferred speciﬁcations are those that include university ﬁxed eﬀects. It is possible that
there is unaccounted university heterogeneity in the non ﬁxed eﬀects regressions.
Finally, the comparative static eﬀects of all other parameters in the funding stage of
the theoretical model are ambiguous. Empirically, SPILL is our measure of the university-
26industry spillover β. While it is not signiﬁcant in the government funding equation, it is
always negative and signiﬁcant in the industry funding regressions. Intuitively, this suggests
that in their funding decisions, ﬁrms realize the potential for free riding. AGE and AGESQ
are included as measures of life cycle eﬀects. Within the context of the theory, they should
reﬂect assets, which are generally larger, for older faculty. We ﬁnd strong evidence that both
types of funding are increasing in AGE b u ta tad e c r e a s i n gr a t e .
5 Concluding Remarks
Despite survey results showing that industrial managers often consider consulting to be one
of the more important mechanisms for industry to access university research, there is little
research either theoretically or empirically of this mechanism. In this paper, we examine
industrial consulting by university faculty as a mechanism for spillovers and do so in a
context that allows us to link them to government, industry, and university funding decisions.
We develop a theoretical model which yields predictions for the time spent consulting, the
associated fee, and the level of government and industry support for university research as
functions of faculty quality, project characteristics, the researcher’s share of license revenue
from the university project, R&D spillovers, university support for the researcher’s internal
project, as well as the willingness of the ﬁrm and government to sponsor the faculty member’s
research within the university. We then exploit a unique database of funding, publications,
and patents for 458 faculty inventors to estimate parameters of the model.
Both the theory and empirics provide clear evidence of spillovers from government-
supported university research to industry. Moreover, together they suggest an important
role for university policies in inﬂuencing faculty research and consulting. In the consulting
stage, we ﬁnd that an increase in either license revenue or the share that accrues to the
faculty will decrease consulting. Thus as long as the university project is more basic than
the ﬁrm’s, then contrary to the policy concern that licensing might reduce basic research,
the increase in share increases the time devoted to basic research. Perhaps our most striking
results regard the ability of university policies to leverage both government and industry
research funding. We ﬁnd evidence that government and industry funding for university
research are strategic complements, in which case increases in the share of revenue univer-
sities allocate to their researchers and the university’s research infrastructure increase both
government and ﬁrm funding in the university.
We also ﬁnd strong evidence of spillovers from the university to the ﬁrm. In the consulting
stage, we ﬁnd that consulting is positively associated with government funding. In the
context of our theoretical model, this result is possible only if there is a spillover from the
27faculty researcher’s government sponsored research to the ﬁrm’s research problem.
Several qualiﬁers to our work suggest directions for further research. First, one fourth
o ft h ep a t e n t si nt h es a m p l ea s s i g n e dt of o r - p r o ﬁt ﬁrms are assignments to ﬁrms in which
the inventor is a principal (founder, CEO, and/or scientiﬁca d v i s o r ) . Ar o l ea ss c i e n t i ﬁc
advisor is consistent with our interpretation of the faculty researcher choosing t>0 and
is consistent with most university policies as long at t ≤ M. T h ep a t e n tm a yo rm a yn o t
be a follow-on patent to one from the faculty researcher’s university research, in which case
we would interpret the follow on project as xo. Moreover, most conﬂict of interest policies
prohibit faculty from receiving sponsored research from their start ups, so that this example
would be the special case of our model in which F =0 . Of course, we do not diﬀerentiate
between start ups and other types of ﬁrms in the analysis so we abstract from many of the
nuances of faculty start ups.
Second, our empirical measure of consulting is limited in that is only includes consulting
that leads to patentable results, and we do not have measures of the reverse spillovers to the
ﬁrm. Nonetheless, to our knowledge there do not exist available databases, the development
of which would be a nontrivial task.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence in the Second-Stage Game
Assume the ﬁrm allocates a ﬁxed amount Bf > 0 t oR & Di nag i v e np e r i o d ,s oc ∈ [0,B f/M].
Lemma 1 Consider the strategic form game with the researcher and ﬁrm as the players,
whose strategies are t ∈ [0,M] and c ∈ [0,B f/M],a n dp a y o ﬀ functions are deﬁned by (2)
and (4). Also assume each player’s payoﬀ function is continuous and strictly quasi-concave
in its own strategy, given any strategy choices by the other players. Then this game has a
Nash equilibrium (t∗(G,F),c ∗(G,F)).
Proof. Because the number of players is ﬁnite, their strategy sets are compact and
nonempty, and their payoﬀ functions are continuous and strictly quasi-concave, this follows
directly from the well-known existence theorem for strategic form games with continuous
strategy spaces (see, for example, Friedman 1977).
31A.2 Properties of the Researcher’s Best Reply
Her best reply function, ˆ t(c),i sd e ﬁned by argmax{t ∈ [0,M]:EU(G,F,t,c)}. We suppress
its dependence on the other parameters j = G,F,β,λ,q,xI,KI,xO,KO,A,L,γ for notational
convenience. In general, we are interested in whether and when her best reply is positive,
so she supplies time to consulting, whether and when she supplies all available time M to
















deﬁnes the range of her best reply.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that when her best reply is interior, its slope is ˆ t0(c)=
−(∂2EU
∂t∂c )/(∂2EU
∂t2 ), which has the sign of ∂2EU
∂t∂c by the strict concavity of EU.F r o m(8),w i t h
risk-neutrality, ∂2EU
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∂τ and the ﬁrst term in ∂2EU
∂t∂c is negative. Similarly, if she is risk averse, then
ct[pI
∂2U(Rs,Ws)
∂Y 2 +( 1− pI)
∂2U(Rf,Wf)
∂Y 2 ] < 0 as well, so (8) is more likely to be negative.
Lemma 2 The researcher’s best reply function in consulting time, ˆ t(c), is positive only if
cm =m i n {c :
∂EU(G,F,0,c)
∂t =0 } exists and is ﬁnite. If so, then cm > 0, and her best reply
is positive and increasing in the consulting fee, ˆ t(c) > 0 and ˆ t0(c) > 0,f o ra l lf e e si na
neighborhood above cm.




∂τ [U(Rs,A+ γL) − U(Rf,A)] < 0
for all t because Rs >R f, γL > 0, and positive marginal utility imply that U(Rs,A+γL) >
U(Rf,A),a n d
∂pI
∂τ > 0. Hence, because t is constrained to be nonnegative, ˆ t(0) = 0.T h a t
is, if we plotted
∂EU(G,F,t,c)
∂t as a function of c for ﬁxed (G,F,t), then it would intersect the
(vertical) utility axis at a negative value. Because
∂2EU(G,F,t,c)
∂t2 < 0,i f
∂EU(G,F,0,c)
∂t < 0 for
all c ∈ [0,B f/M],t h e n
∂EU(G,F,t,c)
∂t < 0 for all c, and consulting never occurs, ˆ t(c)=0for
all c. However, the slope of ∂EU







∂Y > 0 Thus, it is possible that
∂EU(G,F,t,c)
∂t increases (though perhaps not
monotonically) as c increases, and eventually intersects the (horizontal) c axis. If so, there
exists a positive, ﬁnite cm deﬁned as above. By continuity,
∂2EU(G,F,0,cm)
∂t∂c > 0.N o t e t h a t
32cm is the fee at which the function EU(G,F,t,c) takes on its unconstrained maximum at
t =0(or the smallest fee if this occurs for more than one value). Therefore, for all fees in a
neighborhood above cm, EU(G,F,t,c) takes on its unconstrained maximum at some t>0,
so ˆ t(c) > 0.M o r e o v e r ,ˆ t0(c) > 0 in this neighborhood from the proof of Theorem 1 because
∂2EU(G,F,0,cm)
∂t∂c > 0.
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∂Y =0 . Combining this and the
preceding results proves all statements in Theorem 3 and all in Theorem 2 except for those
about G,F, and KI in (iv).
Finally, recall that ∂2EU
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∂t2 < 0, which contradicts the local stability condition. This proves statements
(iv)(b) and (iv)(b) in Theorem 2.
A.3 Existence in First-Stage Game
Lemma 3 Consider the strategic form game with the government funding agency and ﬁrm
as the players, whose strategies are G ∈ [0,B g] and F ∈ [0,B f],a n dp a y o ﬀ functions are
deﬁned by (8) and (9). Also assume each player’s payoﬀ function is continuous and strictly
quasi-concave in its own strategy, given any strategy choices by the other players. Then this
game has a Nash equilibrium (G∗,F∗),a n d(G∗,F∗,t ∗(G∗,F∗),c ∗(G∗,F∗)) is the subgame
33perfect equilibrium of the two-stage funding game.
A.4 Properties of First-Stage Equilibrium
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all ambiguous. The statements of the theorem then follow immediately from these results
plus locally stability.
34B Method of Identifying Faculty Patents
W es t a r t e dw i t ht h en a m e so fe v e r ys c i e n t i s ta n de n g i n e e ri nP h Dg r a n t i n gd e p a r t m e n t s
at Cornell, Georgia Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue,
Stanford, Texas A & M, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin reported in the National Research
Council’s (1995) survey of PhD granting departments in the US. The list is for faculty
in residence in 1993. The names were compared to inventor names on US patents granted
between 1993 and 1999. Once names had been paired we used a multi-staged name screening
process to insure that the faculty member and the inventor are the same. The ﬁrst step was
to check the distance between the zip code of the university and the zip code of the city of
residence of the inventor. If the distance was more than 50 miles the patent was removed
from the database. The average zip code distance in the ﬁnal data is less than 7 miles.
We then used the surname data from the 1990 Census to evaluate the incidence of each
name. At this point we used various ﬁlters to eliminate common names. The ﬁlter was least
dense when we had a match on ﬁrst, middle and last name for the university faculty listing
and the name on the patent. The ﬁlter was most dense when we could only match a last
name and ﬁrst initial. About 10% of the matches are eliminated because of common names.
From the NRC survey we know that a faculty member is at a respective university in 1993
(the year of the survey). Our procedure for verifying institutional aﬃliation for inventors
on applications ﬁled in years other than 1993 was the following. If the assignment was
to the inventor’s 1993 university we assumed the inventor was with the university. If the
assignment was not to that university, we used a combination of web searches and the faculty
listing in the National Faculty Directory to verify aﬃliation. If we determined that a faculty
m e m b e rw a so nt h ef a c u l t yi na n yy e a ra f t e r1 9 9 3w ea s s u m e ds h ew a so nt h ef a c u l t yi nt h e
intervening years between 1993 and the latter year. If we could not verify faculty aﬃliation
for the patent application year the patent was dropped.
The ﬁnal data contains 1690 patent/inventor pairs where assignment of the patent is
either to the university or to a ﬁrm. These pairs include 1532 patents and 458 faculty
i n v e n t o r s .W h e nt h e r ea r et w oo rm o r ef a c u l t yi n v e n t o r so nap a t e n tw er a n d o m l yd r o pt h e
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Firm Funding Firm Funding
First Stage  First Stage 
Figure 3  Figure 3 Table 1. Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
AGE Inventor age 1455 49.318 10.009 28 83
ARTICLE_CITES Articles cited in patent 1521 17.108 23.666 0 203
AVER_CO_AUTHORS Average number of univ. co-authors 1521 12.532 43.210 0 418.843
BIOSCI Bio science faculty 1521 0.342 0.474 0 1
DEPT_QUAL Dept. quality 1521 4.277 0.530 2 4.97
ENG Engineering faculty 1521 0.460 0.499 0 1
FOR_CITES Forward patent citations 1521 21.131 36.994 0 459
GOV_FND Federal funding 1521 0.838 1.841 0 15.021
IND_FND Industrial funding 1521 0.165 0.562 0 4.177
INVENTSHARE Inventor share of licensing revenue 1521 30.486 7.208 20 50
MALE Inventor is male 1494 0.952 0.214 0 1
ORIGINAL Measure of patent originality 1374 0.465 0.291 0 0.930
PAT_CITES Patent citations to prior patents 1521 11.938 19.901 0 354
PERIOD Yearly trend 1521 4.505 1.742 1 8
PHYSCI Physical science faculty 1521 0.198 0.399 0 1
PUB_CITES Citations to publications 1521 264.858 533.241 0 6557
PUBLIC University is public 1521 0.318 0.466 0 1
PUBS Annual publications 1521 7.300 8.525 0 51
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO Graduate student faculty ratio 1441 3.655 2.320 0 13
TENURE Facult member is tenured 1521 0.774 0.418 0 1
TOT_FUNDS_RATIO Ratio of total dept. funding to faculty 1492 0.552 0.747 0 4.775
TOT_GRANTS_RATIO Ratio of number of dept. grants to facutly 1521 3.640 1.782 0.302 10.333
UNIV_RD_EXPEND University R&D expenditures 1521 362493 70680 161714 509782
UNIVASSIGN Patent is assigned to university 1521 0.690 0.463 0 1
URBAN University in urban area 1521 0.645 0.479 0 1
All funding variables are in millions of real dollars.Table 2. Consulting
Dependent Variable: ASSIGN=1 if assigned to a firm.
Part A Part B
Odds Ratio t-Statistic Odds Ratio t-Statistic
LAG_PUB 0.791 -1.01 0.739 -1.36
LAG_PUB_CITES 0.970 -0.35 1.003 0.04
LAG_GOVFND 1.021 2.01 ** 1.023 2.13 **
LAG_INDFND 0.983 -1.23 0.982 -1.28
TENURE 1.088 0.27 0.990 -0.03
ENG 0.617 -0.92 0.562 -1.07
PHYSIC 1.632 0.91 1.489 0.72
ORIGINAL 0.313 -2.87 *** 0.303 -2.94 ***
PATENT_CITES 2.248 5.20 *** 2.301 5.29 ***
FOR_CITES 0.965 -0.35 0.987 -0.14
ARTICLE_CITES 0.704 -3.36 *** 0.702 -3.34 ***
AGE 0.826 -1.61 0.857 -1.29
AGESQ 1.002 1.58 1.001 1.26
MALE 0.738 -0.54 0.853 -0.31
TREND 1.093 1.38 1.096 1.6
DEPT_QUAL 1.001 0.00 1.582 1.44
UNIV_RD_EXPEND 0.353 -0.68 0.350 -1.41
AVER_CO_AUTHORS 1.336 2.98 *** 1.291 2.85 ***
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO 0.865 -1.66 * 0.948 -0.61
TOT_GRANTS_RATIO 1.023 0.18 0.989 -0.09




University Fixed Effets YES NO
Pseudo R-Square 0.178 0.16
Observations 1215 1215Table 3. Government Funding
Part A Part B Part C Part D
Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic
INDFND 0.0258 2.11 ** 0.0187 1.57 0.0327 2.47 ** 0.0267 2.05 **
LAG_GOVFND 0.1128 7.03 *** 0.1105 6.93 ***
LAG_PUB 0.1372 1.51 0.1671 1.85 * 0.1532 1.68 * 0.1807 1.99 **
LAG_PUB_CITES 0.0359 0.94 0.0250 0.65 0.0558 1.42 0.0454 1.15
TENURE -0.0885 -0.61 -0.0962 -0.68 -0.0623 -0.39 -0.0752 -0.50
SPILL -0.0140 -0.20 -0.0559 -0.76 0.0026 0.03 -0.0292 -0.39
ENG 0.0798 0.38 0.1054 0.51 0.0934 0.40 0.1048 0.46
PHYSIC 0.5532 2.37 ** 0.5954 2.70 *** 0.6659 2.57 * 0.6964 2.82 ***
AGE 0.1091 2.06 ** 0.1002 1.88 * 0.1541 2.72 *** 0.1480 2.62 ***
AGESQ -0.0011 -2.16 ** -0.0010 -1.99 ** -0.0015 -2.75 *** -0.0014 -2.65 ***
MALE 0.3511 1.38 0.3442 1.32 0.4531 1.61 0.4545 1.59
PERIOD 0.0082 0.31 -0.0016 -0.06 0.0246 0.89 0.0224 0.91
DEPT_QUAL 0.3664 1.94 * 0.2405 1.47 0.3798 1.93 * 0.2724 1.60
UNIV_RD_EXPEND -0.3300 -0.50 0.7316 2.55 ** 0.0893 0.13 0.6087 2.13 **
AVER_CO_AUTHORS 0.0388 0.58 0.0442 0.66 0.0319 0.49 0.0410 0.64
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO -0.1222 -2.57 * -0.1411 -3.28 *** -0.1271 -2.39 ** -0.1386 -2.86 ***
TOT_GRANTS_RATIO 0.0203 0.48 0.0318 0.76 0.0181 0.41 0.0266 0.61
TOT_FUNDS_RATIO 0.6085 3.69 *** 0.6601 4.58 *** 0.6954 3.84 *** 0.7788 4.86 ***
PUBLIC 0.2874 1.51 -0.2690 -1.44
INVENTSHARE -0.0171 -1.33 -0.0213 -1.73 *
URBAN 0.5138 3.03 *** 0.4708 2.69 ***
University Fixed Effets YES NO YES NO
Observations 956 956 956 956Table 4. Industry Funding
Part A Part B Part C Part D
Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic Coeff t-Statistic
GOVFND 0.0460 1.32 0.0508 1.43 0.0577 1.76 * 0.0578 1.72 *
LAG_INDFND 0.0906 5.87 *** 0.0901 5.81 ***
LAG_PUB 0.1853 1.22 0.2223 1.50 0.3303 2.53 *** 0.3523 2.67 ***
LAG_PUB_CITES -0.0853 -1.26 -0.0965 -1.43 -0.1156 -1.91 * -0.1163 -1.86 *
TENURE -0.6663 -3.15 *** -0.6515 -3.04 *** -0.6555 -3.06 *** -0.6269 -2.89 ***
SPILL -0.6392 -4.22 *** -0.7004 -4.54 *** -0.6926 -4.18 *** -0.7262 -4.12 ***
ENG -0.2475 -0.70 -0.2104 -0.59 -0.4377 -1.28 -0.3570 -1.01
PHYSIC -0.4814 -1.48 -0.3785 -1.25 -0.7810 -2.21 *** -0.6620 -1.94 *
AGE 0.1996 2.27 ** 0.1616 1.90 * 0.1876 2.11 *** 0.1555 1.81 *
AGESQ -0.0019 -2.27 ** -0.0016 -1.91 * -0.0018 -2.11 *** -0.0015 -1.82 *
MALE 0.1542 0.31 0.1959 0.39 0.2875 0.58 0.2589 0.53
PERIOD 0.0682 1.48 0.0853 2.16 ** 0.0717 1.57 0.0889 2.26 **
DEPT_QUAL -0.0074 -0.03 -0.3723 -1.95 ** 0.0839 0.35 -0.1205 -0.67
UNIV_RD_EXPEND 1.2959 1.13 0.2246 0.46 1.6012 1.39 0.1397 0.31
AVER_CO_AUTHORS 0.1475 2.15 *** 0.1746 2.56 *** 0.1155 1.61 0.1271 1.79 *
STUDENT_FAC_RATIO 0.1065 1.76 * 0.0590 1.15 0.1386 2.14 *** 0.0869 1.59
TOT_GRANTS_RATIO -0.2037 -2.55 *** -0.1772 -2.21 ** -0.2249 -2.70 *** -0.2093 -2.58 ***
TOT_FUNDS_RATIO 0.5091 2.75 *** 0.3031 1.84 * 0.5051 2.65 *** 0.1723 0.95
PUBLIC 0.4143 1.41 0.2691 0.97
INVENTSHARE -0.0208 -1.50 -0.0125 -1.01
URBAN 0.4574 1.80 * 0.5202 2.01 **
University Fixed Effets YES NO YES NO
Observations 956 956 956 956